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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to situate India’s recent economic growth in the long 
sweep of the twentieth century and to understand what is different about the 
contemporary growth experience from earlier episodes. The paper argues that most 
interpretations of India’s growth acceleration tend to privilege one dimension of the 
growth experience over another, and that the causes of India’s growth suggest a more 
complex causal story and that no single perspective can provide a convincing 
explanation of India’s growth phenomenon. The paper also argues that in contrast to 
the previous growth success stories of the developing world, especially those 
originating from Asia, India’s pattern of growth has followed a non-standard route 
that privileges knowledge-intensive services and capital-intensive manufacturing over 
labour-intensive manufacturing, which is not in India’s long-term interests, either 
from viewpoints of efficiency or equity. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Indian economy has been growing at a faster pace in recent decades than it has 
done so in the first few decades after independence, and is one of the three fastest 
growing nations along with China and Vietnam in the past couple of decades. 
There has been a rapidly growing literature on the implications of India‟s rapid rise 
                                                 
1
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referee. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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as an economic power in the world (Luce 2006, Panagariya 2008, Rothermund 
2008). However, the reasons for India‟s recent economic growth and when the 
growth acceleration actually began remains fiercely contested. One view stresses 
the role of the market and adoption of neoliberal policies by the Indian government 
since 1991. Another view emphasises the role of the state in the earlier years of 
import substituting industrialisation as being the cause of economic growth in 
subsequent years.  Furthermore, a revisionist view has also argued that India‟s 
growth in recent decades is not particularly distinctive as compared to average 
Indian economic growth since independence.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to situate Indian economic growth in the long 
sweep of the twentieth century and to understand what is different about the 
contemporary growth experience from earlier episodes. Given current concerns on 
the implications of the move by the Indian state to neo-liberal policies for poverty 
and equity in India, we will ask how transformative the pattern of economic growth 
has been in and its implications for poverty in India. In the next section, we first 
determine the timing of India‟s growth acceleration. We then analyse what was 
distinctive about contemporary growth as compared to earlier periods. Section 3 
examines the dominant perspectives on the causes of Indian economic growth. 
Section 4 assesses the pattern of India‟s recent growth, assessing the implications 
of recent growth for the large numbers of the poor that still remain in India today. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
INDIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE LONG TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: STYLIZED FACTS 
 
When did growth accelerate? 
 
The standard tale of India‟s recent economic ascendancy in the world that figures 
in the international financial press is that the radical economic reforms of 1991 
initiated by the Government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao was the primary 
cause of India‟s strong economic growth. In this tale, the reforms of 1991 swept 
away the socialist policies that were initiated by the Nehruvian regime after 
independence and that persisted in various degrees in the post-independence 
decades, and these reforms led to economic growth. However, a closer look at the 
data does not support such an account of India‟s economic growth, which attributes 
most if not all of the latter to economic reforms. As is clear from Figure 1, after a 
long period of stagnation, especially from the mid sixties to the late seventies, GDP 
per capita started rising in the late seventies, and has kept on steadily increasing 
over the last two decades of the twentieth century. 
 
Current research on India‟s growth experience dates the timing of the growth 
acceleration to 1980 (Rodrik and Subramanian (RS) 2005, Kohli 2006), though 
there are others who time the date of the turn-around slightly later, in 1985 (De 
Long 2004). However, the timing of the turn-around as in the conventional wisdom 
on India‟s growth seems to be sensitive to the choice of the base year - the Indian 
economy contracted significantly in 1979, due to the second oil price shock and 
due to a drought which was the worst since independence (Joshi and Little 1994). 
The growth rate of the economy in this year was a staggering negative 5.2 per cent 
– the highest drop in GDP that has happened in India since independence. The 
growth rate of the economy, including the shock year of 1979 is 3.7 per cent per 
annum. If we exclude 1979 from our calculations, we find that the growth rate of 
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the economy in 1975-1978 is a more respectable 6.0 per cent per annum, not very 
different from the average growth rate of the economy in the 1980s.
3
  
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of GDP per worker, 1950-2000 
 
Source: our calculations from the National Accounts Statistics;  
estimates of total workers employed from Sivasubromanian (2000) . 
 
 
This is also apparent from a closer look at the estimates presented by the two of the 
main protagonists in this debate – RS and Delong – reproduced in Figures 2 and 3 
below. Figure 2, from RS, shows that the turn-around in growth occurs around 
1975-76. RS also include the evolution of economy-wide total factor productivity 
in the figure, and we can observe that the turn-around in economic growth 
coincided with a turn-around in productivity growth in the economy. 
 
Figure 3 is from De Long, who establishes the timing of India‟s growth 
acceleration by estimating the trend level of GDP per capita over the period 1962-
1980, and plotting actual GDP per capita over the period 1962-2000 against the 
trend rate. It is clear that once we exclude the outlier of 1979, actual GDP per 
capita started deviating from its trend level in an upward direction from the mid-
1970s, which suggests that growth had already accelerated by the late 1970s.
4
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The average growth of GDP in 1980-1990 was 5.9 per cent per annum. 
4
  The timing of the growth acceleration is also supported by the rigorous statistical analysis 
of Balakrishnan and Parameswaran (2007) who find that there is a single shift in the GDP 
series in the post-independence period which occured in 1978-1979. 
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Figure 2. Economic Performance in India, 1960-2000 
 
Note: log scale, 1960=1; Source: RS (2004) 
  
 
Figure 3.  Indian GDP per capita level and 1962-1980 Trend 
 
Source: De Long (2003) 
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Once we accept the basic proposition that India‟s growth acceleration pre-dates the 
1991 reforms, and thus, cannot be directly attributed to the reforms themselves, 
why does it matter when exactly the acceleration did occur? What purpose does it 
serve to get the timing of the growth acceleration absolutely right, when the 
broader point is to refute the view that all was „gloom and doom‟ with the Indian 
economy till the reformers had their way. We will argue later in the paper that the 
timing of the acceleration holds the key to the puzzle that has engaged India-
observers in recent years: why did growth accelerate in the late 1970s to early 
1980s? But first, before we address this question, we would like to make three 
observations on India‟s growth experience across the century, particularly in the 
two and half to three decades following independence. 
 
 
Did the break from colonial rule matter for India’s economic growth?  
 
In an important article published in Modern Asian Studies, Deepak Nayyar argues 
that if we consider India‟s growth over the twentieth century, „the turning point 
(for economic growth) came in the early 1950s‟ (2006: 801), and there was a 
upward shift in growth rates in national income in the post-independence years 
from the near-stagnation in per capita income in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Thus, it was the break from colonial rule that marks India‟s economic 
performance in the long twentieth century, less so the growth acceleration of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. This point is also made by Balakrishnan (2007), though 
with specific reference to the Nehru era. However, a closer look at the data does 
not unequivocally support such a reading of India‟s growth experience, especially 
if one were to consider that India went through two very different growth phases in 
the first half of the twentieth century. In the first period, up to 1914, global trade 
increased to unprecedented levels due to dramatically decreasing transport costs 
and the „common currency‟ effect of the gold standard (Estevadeordal 2003 et al., 
Findlay and O‟Rourke 2007). During this period, India had a liberal trade regime 
imposed on it by its colonial master, the British. In this period, India benefited 
from increased integration with a Europe-centred world economy (Roy 2006). In 
the second period, 1914-1947, following the outbreak of the First World War and 
leading up to the Great Depression, transport costs started rising, the gold standard 
was on the demise and protectionism was on the increase. This led to a phase what 
the economic historians Findlay and O‟Rourke describe as „deglobalisation‟ as 
world trade volumes collapsed. India, with its dependence on the world economy 
for its growth impulse in the colonial period, suffered a protracted stagnation in 
standards of living.  
 
To see whether growth rates differed in pre- and post-independence India, we 
divide the second half of the twentieth century into five periods, 1950-1964, the 
immediate post-independence period; 1965-1977, the period of stagnation, 
according to most readings of Indian economic development, 1978-1990, the 
period of the initial growth acceleration and finally, 1991-2000, when economic 
reforms were well underway. Classifying the first half of the twentieth century into 
two phases – the phases of globalisation and deglobalisation, 1900-1914 and 1914-
1947, we see from Figure 4 that growth in national income, especially from the 
mid 1960s to the late 1970s, was the same as the first decade and a half of the 
twentieth century, and it is only in the period 1978-1990 that one sees a clear break 
from the growth rates of early twentieth century colonial India.  This is more 
evident when we look at India‟s performance relative to the UK and the USA over 
130 years (Figure 5) beginning from 1870. It is only from the late 1980s that 
India‟s per capita incomes starting rising relative to per capita income levels of 
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Britain and the US, and prior to this period, Indian relative incomes had been 
steadily falling. In the first three decades after independence, the Indian economy 
witnessed significant structural change and diversified very gradually from a 
backward agriculture-based economy that was vulnerable to climactic and external 
shocks in the colonial period to one that was more self-reliant, and that had 
increasing proportions of economic activity in modern industry and 
commercialised agriculture. But a decisive break from pre-independence standards 
of living cannot be counted as one of the achievements of Indian economic 
performance during this period. 
 
 
Figure 4. Growth in Per Capita Income in the Twentieth Century 
 
Sources: 1900-1914 and 1914-1947 from Roy (2006); 
 post 1950 estimates are from National Accounts Statistics. 
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Figure 5. India’s GDP per capita, relative to Britain and the USA 
 
 
Source: Clark and Wolcott (2004) 
 
 
An ‘Average’ India? 
 
There has been a revisionist view emerging in recent analysis of India‟s growth 
which argues that in the post-World War II period up to the 1980s, India‟s growth 
performance was average relative to other countries. It was „not nearly as bad as 
the growth performance in Africa … and not nearly as good as the growth 
performance in East Asia‟ (De Long 2004: 193). De Long bases his finding on the 
estimates of a simple neoclassical growth model, which shows that India‟s growth 
rate has been what may be predicted from the initial level of output per worker, the 
rate of investment and the rate of population growth. In a similar vein, Nayyar 
(2007) suggests that „a story that depicts an average India is much more plausible 
than the caricature which portrays a failed India‟ (2006: 812) while speaking about 
the heydays of the License Raj. This would suggest that influential critiques of 
India‟s economic policies of the first three post-independence decades, such as 
Bhagwati and Desai (1970) and Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1975) may have over-
stated the apparently pernicious effects of these policies on India‟s economic 
performance. Referring to these policies, De Long argues, „India‟s growth 
management policies were not that damaging or rather that they were par for the 
course in the post World War II period‟ (2004: 193). 
 
However, this conclusion is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it is based on 
a simple neoclassical model of growth which has lost legitimacy in recent years in 
explaining economic growth in developing countries, and which itself begs the 
question: why was the investment rate so low for India, compared to other 
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developing countries. The data itself does not support the De Long conclusion - if 
one looks at calculations of growth rates for India and for other developing regions 
for the periods 1960-1980 and 1980-2000, it is clear that India underperformed 
relative to all other developing regions in 1960-1980, but outperformed these 
regions by a wide margin in 1980-2000 (Figure 6). Secondly, De Long does not 
ask the more appropriate question: what should have been India‟s economic growth 
in the three decades of the post-independence period, given India‟s geography and 
its institutions at the time of independence, the two variables which we now know 
are the deep determinants of economic growth. India has had more a favourable 
geography than many other developing countries – its long coast-line and its size in 
terms of population are both geographical factors that economists consider to be 
favourable to economic growth. India inherited an English common law legal 
system, and had a well functioning parliamentary democracy and a stable regime of 
private property rights by the virtue of the mixed economy model that India‟s 
political leaders adopted at the time of independence, all of which have been found 
to be powerful institutional determinants of economic growth in the literature 
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 , La Porta et al. 2008, Acemoglu 2008). 
The argument that India underperformed in the first three decades post 
independence relative to its geographical and institutional endowments at the time 
of independence is also supported by the econometric analysis of RS, who find that 
India‟s level of income in 1980 was about a quarter of what it should have been, 
given the strength of its economic institutions. We find no compelling reason then 
to over-turn the assessment of Bhagwati-Desai-Srinivasan and many others that 
India‟s economic performance during the period of import substitution 
industrialisation and the License Raj was below average for developing countries 
for that period.
5
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Though many other developing countries adopted similar inward looking economic 
policies roughly in the same period, Findlay and O‟Rourke (2007) show that India‟s trade 
regime was among the most restrictive, and the negative effect of the inward looking trade 
regime on growth was accentuated with an inefficient industrial licensing system perhaps 
unique in its complexity in the world, which as Bhagwati (1993) pointed out, „had 
degenerated into a series of arbitrary, indeed inherently arbritrary, decisions where, for 
instance, one activity would be chosen over another simply because the administering 
bureaucrats were so empowered, and indeed obligated, to choose‟ (p. 50). 
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Figure 6. Growth Rates for India in Comparison with Other Regions 
 
 
Source: RS (2004) 
Growth in the 1990s 
 
Even if we were to conclude that India‟s growth acceleration preceded the 
economic reforms of the 1990s, one needs to be careful in not over-stating the case 
that the reforms of the post-1991 period did not matter in explaining India‟s high 
economic growth. What the data seems to suggest is that the growth rate of GDP 
per worker which had picked up in the late 1970s increased even further in the 
1990s. This is most obvious from DeLong‟s figure (Figure 3) which shows that 
economic growth in India did not follow  a simple linear process (as would be 
predicted by neoclassical theories of economic growth), and that there were 
interlocking and cumulative causation forces at work that seemed to take the 
economy from one plateau to the next. Such a view of economic growth is not new 
to early observers of the growth process such as Gunnar Myrdal (?) and Walter 
Rostow (?), but seems to have been often missing in contemporary accounts of 
economic growth.     
 
 
WHAT CAUSED GROWTH TO ACCELERATE? 
 
Unpacking the Growth Story 
 
What were the proximate causes of India‟s growth acceleration? Figure 7 shows 
that the increase in the growth rate in the 1980s and 1990s occurred primarily due 
to greater accumulation of physical capital and an increase in productivity of 
capital, labour and land. Education (or human capital in the language of 
economists) and land expansion were not the sources of growth. There has been 
some controversy in the context of East Asia on whether factor accumulation or 
productivity has been primarily responsible for the region‟s economic growth, with 
one influential view arguing that East Asia‟s economic growth has been mostly due 
to factor accumulation and not productivity growth. In the Indian context, it seems 
that both factor accumulation and productivity growth were both responsible for 
India‟s recent growth experience.  
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Figure 7. Sources of India’s Growth 
 
Source: Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2006). 
Factor accumulation and productivity growth by themselves do not explain growth, 
and as the economic historian Douglas North noted, these factors are “not sources 
of growth; they are growth”.  So we need to dig deeper into the underlying 
determinants of the greater factor accumulation and productivity growth to 
understand the fundamental causes of India‟s growth.  
 
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the behaviour of capital accumulation 
in the 1980s and 1990s has been the significant increase in the rate of fixed 
investment (which comprises investment in machinery and housing) in India since 
the late 1970s. Figure 8 makes clear that this has been the case, driven by a 
remarkable increase in machinery investment. As Figure 9 shows, the 
accumulation of machines rather than houses has been primarily been due to a 
sustained increase in machinery investment by the private sector, since private 
investment in housing in fact declined since the late 1970s.
6
 Figure 10 shows that 
while the public fixed investment rate increased from the mid 1970s to the mid 
1980s, both public sector investment in machines and housing started declining 
from the mid 1980s. The private sector in India comprises the household sector, 
which are unincorporated enterprises in manufacturing and services, along with 
farming households, and the corporate sector, comprising medium to large firms, 
                                                 
6
 The increase in the accumulation of machines rather than of housing in the initial phases 
of of India‟s growth acceleration may explain why latter has been sustained over such a 
long period, in contrast to the experiences of other developing countries where by and large 
growth accelerations have been short-lived (Hausman, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005). In Latin 
America and in East Asia just before the 1997 financial crisis (and to some extent in the US 
and the UK more recently), several episodes of growth have been cut short as growth was 
driven by a housing (and consumer durable spending) boom fuelled by cheap credit that 
eventually led to financial and exchange rate crises. In contrast to these episodes, India‟s 
growth experience has perhaps been built on more solid foundations. Furthermore, the 
relative stagnation in housing investment in India‟s strong growth period suggests that 
accounts of India‟s growth which identifies Keynesian style demand driven investment led 
growth mechanisms as the sole cause of growth in the 1980s (e.g. Bhaduri 2008) are wholly 
not supported by the data – there is no reason to expect that demand side factors will favour 
machinery over housing.    
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mostly operating in industry and services. Disaggregated data shows that both 
households and corporate firms were responsible for the unprecedented surge in 
investment in machines (Sen 2007).   
 
 
Figure 8. Fixed Investment 
 
Note:  Fixed Investment and its components 
 and GDP in constant 1993-94 prices. 
Source: our calculations from National Accounts Statistics. 
 
 
Figure 9. Private Fixed Investment 
 
Note:  Private Fixed Investment and its components 
 and GDP in constant 1993-94 prices. 
Source: our calculations from National Accounts Statistics.  
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Figure 10. Public Fixed Investment  
 
Note:  Public Fixed Investment and its components, and GDP in constant 1993-94 prices. 
 
 
Private Investment in Machines as the cause of growth 
 
Can we attribute India‟s growth acceleration to the surge in private investment in 
machines? We can do so for two reasons. Firstly, among the various determinants 
of economic growth that has been extensively studied by economists, the one 
variable that is robust to most specifications and sample size changes is the 
investment rate (Levine and Renelt 1992). And among the different types of 
investment, the rate of investment that seems to really matter for economic growth 
is machinery (or equipment) investment (De Long and Summers 1991,1992, 1993). 
As De Long and Summers (1993: 396) note, “rapid growth is found where 
equipment investment is high and slow growth where equipment investment is 
low”. De Long and Summers find that the cross-economy positive association 
between output per worker and investment in machinery and equipment is 
particularly true for developing countries. In addition, "historical accounts of 
economic growth invariably assign a central role to mechanization" (De Long and 
Summers 1991: 447). The reason why machinery investment matters for economic 
growth than other types of investment is that the role of external economies is 
greater for machinery investment than for housing investment, due to the greater 
amount of research and development expenditures in the machinery sector. 
Interestingly, among the countries that De Long and Summers have studied, India 
has had one of lowest rates of machinery investment for the period 1960-1985 and 
one of the lowest levels of income per capita in 1980 in the same sample of 
countries.  
 
The second reason we can be confident that the increase in private investment 
in machines is the predominant cause of India‟s growth acceleration is that 
econometric analysis shows that among the different possible sources of India‟s 
growth, private machinery investment has had by a wide margin the strongest 
effect on growth rates (Sen 2007).  The increase in machinery investment can 
explain both the faster rate of accumulation of capital and the increase in 
productivity – the two proximate sources of India‟s growth take-off that we have 
observed earlier. Machinery investment triggered an increase in productivity by 
learning by doing as workers learn the skills necessary to operate the new machines 
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and also via the adoption of state-of-the-art technology embodied in new capital 
goods.
7
 The increase in machinery investment had, therefore, an enormously strong 
effect on growth, working its way through both capital accumulation and aggregate 
productivity growth.
8
  
 
 
What ultimately caused growth to accelerate? 
 
Picking out the centrality of private machinery investment in India‟s growth story 
still does not answer the question: what led to its surge since the late 1970s? There 
were three principal reasons why the surge occurred.
9
 The first was financial 
deepening brought about by bank nationalisation. In 1969, fourteen of India‟s 
largest commercial banks were nationalised by the government of the day, which 
was headed by Indira Gandhi in her first stint as the Prime Minister of the country. 
As commercial banks came under „social control‟, these newly nationalised banks 
were asked to mobilise resources on a massive scale by opening branches in rural 
and semi-urban areas as the Reserve Bank of India enforced a strict branch 
licensing policy (Sen and Vaidya 1997). This objective was largely realised. 
Deposits as a percentage of national income increased from 15.2 per cent in 1969 
to 37.9 per cent in 1984, while population per bank office – a measure of bank 
density – fell from 65 thousand in 1969 to 15 thousand in 1984.10  
 
The increase in bank density had a significant positive effect on private saving 
(Athukorala and Sen 2002). This large amount of resources in the Indian banking 
sector made its way to firms and producer-households as loanable funds for 
investment in two ways. The first was a direct route. With the introduction of 
„priority sector lending requirements‟ as commercial banks came under social 
control, banks had to lend a large proportion of this increased level of deposits to 
producer-households in the industrial and agricultural sectors for both working and 
fixed capital purposes. Household machinery investment increased in the 1970s, as 
the Green Revolution began to have its effect on rural areas of Northern states such 
as Haryana and Punjab. The second route was an indirect one. As commercial 
banks found their deposit base increase, they invested in bonds and debentures of 
term-lending institutions and state-owned insurance and mutual funds companies. 
These resources then made their way to the private corporate sector via loans from 
term-lending institutions and investment in shares and bonds of corporate firms by 
the state-owned insurance and mutual funds companies.
11
 Thus, the net result of the 
                                                 
7
 We find that the correlation between aggregate productivity and private machinery 
investment is 0.96 for the period 1960-2003.  
8
 The increase in productivity growth occurred initially in the agricultural sector in the 
second half of the 1970s, as farmers started investing in new machines during the Green 
Revolution. The productivity growth then occurred in the manufacturing sector, as 
corporate firms started investing in machines in the 1980s. The increase in productivity 
finally spilled over to services as new telecommunication equipment became available 
following the telecommunication revolution that occurred in the 1990s in India. I draw 
these inferences from analysing the disaggregated estimates of total factor productivity of 
Bosworth-Collins-Virmani (2006). 
9
  The detailed statistical analysis that supports this assertion is undertaken in Athukorala 
and Sen (2002), Sen (2007) and Sen (2008). 
10
 The increase in the growth of bank branches in rural and semi-urban areas occurred 
primarily in the late 1970s and early 1980s rather than just after the bank nationalisation in 
the early 1970s (Panagariya 2008).   
11
 The share of commercial banks‟ investments in the bonds and debentures of term-lending 
institutions and insurance/mutual funds companies as a source of funds for the latter set of 
institutions increased from 5.9 per cent in 1971-75 to 12.1 per cent in 1976-80, and 
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bank nationalisation was a significant increase in financial deepening, particularly 
since the mid 1970s, as Figure 11 makes clear.
12
 
 
 
Figure 11. Financial Deepening 
 
Note: Financial Deepening is Total Credit to the Private Sector as a ratio of GDP. 
Source: our calculations from IMF‟s International Financial Statistics. 
 
 
The second determinant of the surge in machinery investment was the rise in public 
fixed investment, which as Pranab Bardhan (1984) has powerfully argued, had a 
strong complementary effect on private investment, at least till the mid 1980s. The 
increase in public investment was mostly in the infrastructural industries – 
petroleum, electricity and railways (Ahluwalia 1991). The private sector responded 
strongly to the larger amount of funds available to it for investment purposes and 
both the demand side and supply side stimuli of public investment, and investment 
in equipment increased strongly from the mid 1970s onwards. This provides an 
explanation of the growth spurt that occurred in the Indian economy from the late 
1970s onwards.  
 
However, by the mid to late 1980s, public fixed investment and financial 
deepening were no longer the prime drivers of private machinery investment, and 
hence, of economic growth. The main reason for this was the increase in fiscal 
imbalances that started occurring over the 1980s mainly due to increasing 
consumption claims on public resources both from established and newly emerging 
distributional coalitions.
13
 With increasing fiscal deficits, capital expenditures 
                                                                                                                            
remained at around that level in 1981-85 (Sen and Vaidya 1997).The share of funds going 
from these institutions to the private corporate sector increased from 12.9 per cent of the 
total use of funds by these institutions in 1971-75 to 21.1 per cent in 1981-85.   
12
 The view that bank nationalisation exerted a strong positive effect on India‟s economic 
growth at the early stages is also shared by Basu and Maertens (2007) and Basu (2008), 
who comments that „it does seem very likely that the bank nationalization contributed to 
the first break in growth rate, via a boost to savings and investment‟ (Basu 2008, p. 399). 
13
 The loss of control over public finances can be traced to the changing political economy 
of the country, as socio- economic groups (such as public sector workers, small-scale 
industrialists and medium and large farmers) that were dormant in the past began to be 
increasingly assertive and asked for a greater share of government subsidies. At the same 
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undertaken by the state was a casualty and public investment rates started to 
decline.
14
 In addition, the government increasingly used the banking sector for a 
captive market for its securities to meet its deficits, nullifying the positive effects 
of financial deepening on private investment that was evident in the earlier period 
(Sen and Vaidya 1997).  
 
By the early 1980s, another factor became increasingly important in 
maintaining the rise in private equipment investment and this was the fall in the 
price of machines. By the late 1970s, due to the strong protectionist regime that 
prevailed for the capital goods sector since independence and the ubiquitous state 
involvement in the production of capital and intermediate goods. India had among 
the most expensive machines in the world. There is little doubt that the high price 
of machines was one of the most important reasons why machinery investment in 
India was so low in the 1960s and 1970s as compared to many other developing 
countries.
15
 As De Long and Summers (1993: 399) have pointed out, “India‟s 
policies have managed to enrich industrialists instead of encouraging industry”. 
The relaxation of import controls that had started with the export-import policy of 
1977-78 gained momentum in the 1980s, with a steady increase in the availability 
of capital and intermediate goods as imports. The resultant competitive pressure on 
the domestic capital and intermediate goods sectors explains to a large extent why 
the price of machines started falling steadily since the 1980s, as is evident from 
Figure 12. The import liberalisation of capital goods was accelerated by the Rajiv 
Gandhi government that came to power in 1985. The sustenance of India‟s growth 
acceleration in the mid to late 1980s even during a period where the effects of 
financial deepening and public investment on economic growth was weakening can 
be attributed to the trade reforms that progressed steadily over the 1980s, 
culminating in the lifting of all import controls on all goods in the 1990s.
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
time, with the weakening of political power at the Centre, the Indian state became 
increasingly populist as it resorted to settle the claims of various “pressure-groups” through 
the budgetary process. Kohli (1991) calls these developments in India‟s political economy 
as its “growing crisis of governability”, and Vijay Joshi and Ian Little (1994) attribute these 
developments to „political decay‟ and „political awakening‟.  
14
 Examining the sectoral data on public investment, we find that public investment in 
agriculture started declining from 1979 onwards, which may explain why household 
machinery investment stagnated in the 1980s. The complementarity of public and private 
investment is particularly strong in the case of the agricultural sector. 
15
 Econometric analysis also backs up this point - Jones (1994) shows that there is a strong 
negative relationship between the real price of machines and economic growth, and that the 
former causes the latter. 
16
 Nayyar (2006) also argues that the liberalisation of the regime for the import of capital 
goods contributed to the turn-around in economic growth in the 1980s.  
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Figure 12. Price of Machines vs Housing 
 
Note: Real prices are price deflators of machinery and housing as ratios of the overall GDP 
price deflator. 
Source: our calculations, from National Accounts Statistics 
 
 
The State versus the Market  
 
Our account of India‟s growth story helps us to put into perspective the very heated 
debate that has raged among India observers on whether market-oriented reforms 
that were initiated in the 1980s were responsible for India‟s break in late 1970s 
with what the economist Raj Krishna had termed the Hindu rate of growth of the 
previous decades. The case for market oriented reforms as the sole cause of 
economic growth has been argued most forcefully by Virmani (2007) and 
Panagariya (2008) among others. The case for the role of the state (or at least, 
statist policies) in initiating India‟s economic growth has been made by Atul Kohli 
(2006) and Deepak Nayyar (2006) among others.  
 
It is clear both the state and the market mattered for India‟s growth 
acceleration, but that the manner in which the state and the market played a role in 
economic growth differed both across the period of growth and in the precise set of 
statist and market-oriented policies that matter for growth. In the period mid 1970s 
to the early 1980s, financial deepening which was a consequence of the bank 
nationalisation of 1969 along with an increase in public investment were the key 
factors for India‟s growth acceleration. Growth was sustained from the early 1980s 
onwards by the fall in the price of machines brought about by trade reforms 
targeting the capital (and intermediate) goods sectors. Thus, India‟s growth 
acceleration can be attributed in its early phase to a classically statist model of 
development and in its later phase, to economic reforms which brought down the 
price of machines and made state-of-the-art capital goods accessible to Indian 
firms. 
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Informal and Formal Institutional Change 
 
In an influential set of papers, economists such as De Long (2003) and Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2004) and political scientists such as Kohli (2006) have argued that 
the acceleration in India‟s growth occurred primarily due to a change in the 
attitudes of the national government under the Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi 
towards the private sector from being anti-business to being pro-business and less 
to do with economic policies. As RS state, “the trigger for India‟s economic growth 
was an attitudinal shift on the part of the national government in 1980 in favour of 
private business” (RS: 2).   They argue that this attitudinal shift “left little paper 
trail in actual policies but had an important impact on investors‟ psychology” (RS: 
3).  Similarly, Kohli (2006: 1255) states that “Indira Gandhi shifted India‟s 
political economy around 1980 in the direction of a state and business alliance for 
economic growth”. While De Long dates the timing of the growth acceleration 
later than RS and Kohli at around 1985, he also argues that “the most important 
factor that changed in India over the 1980s had more to do with entrepreneurial 
attitudes and a belief that the rules of the game had changed than with individual 
policy moves” (2003, p. 203). 
 
The argument that India‟s growth acceleration can be attributed more to the 
attitudinal shifts of the government than to substantial policy moves has interested 
not only India-observers but a wider audience as well, and has been influential in 
the literature on the political economy of economic growth. As Rodrik (2003) has 
argued, India‟s growth experience suggests that it may be possible for other 
economies not to undertake significant institutional reforms, particularly of the 
Washington Consensus variety, in order to bring about growth accelerations. The 
„attitudinal shift‟ story of India‟s economic growth seems to suggest that informal 
institutional change related to changes in attitudes and beliefs may be sufficient to 
ignite economic growth without any need for significant changes in formal 
institutions – changes in the actual rules of the game such as reforms in laws and 
regulations that influence economic activity. How valid is such a reading of the 
Indian growth experience? 
 
There has been some debate on the exact timing of the attitudinal change of 
the political elite towards the market. As has been pointed out by Baldev Raj Nayar 
(2006), many of the elements described by Kohli and RS that characterised the 
Indira Gandhi regime of the 1980s were also evident when she was earlier in 
power, especially during and after the turbulent years of 1973 and 1974 (after the 
first oil price shock). For example, in 1974, the national government declared the 
threatened strike by 2 million railway employees as illegal and arrested 20,000 
workers and trade union leaders, „with some display of brutality‟ (Joshi and Little 
1994: 55). In the same year, the national government abandoned the nationalisation 
of the wholesale wheat trade, a pet project of the Left at that time. There were also 
clear changes in the attitudes of the economic bureaucracy towards a more liberal 
view of economic planning during the 1970s.
17
 We have already argued that the 
growth acceleration and the upsurge in private machinery investment started in the 
late 1970s, so if the attitudinal change of the state did in fact occur in the second 
half of 1970s, it would support the RS argument, rather than negate it.  
 
However, there are two important problems with the „attitudinal shift‟ 
argument.  Firstly, there is a tendency in this argument to confuse the apparent 
                                                 
17
 Ahluwalia (1991) noted that, “the second half  of the seventies can be characterized as a 
period of „official reflection‟ marked as it was by a number of official committees 
reviewing different aspects of industrial and trade policies” (p. 5).  
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absence of policy change with the absence of formal institutional change. Both 
they are not one and the same. There was in fact significant formal institutional 
change during the late 1970s and early 1980s to do with both the bank 
nationalisation episode – a large transfer of property rights from the private sector 
to the public sector – and to do with the manner to do with the trade policy changes 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which though much smaller in scope as 
compared to the 1991 reforms, led to a significant alteration of „the rules of the 
game‟ for Indian firms with respect to their relationship with the world economy, 
facing both external competition and access to imported capital goods for the first 
time since independence.     
 
Secondly, it is not obvious that when Indira Gandhi decided to nationalise 
fourteen commercial banks in July 1969, she or her economic advisors saw such a 
policy action as being necessarily favourable to economic growth. I.G. Patel, who 
was Chief Economic Advisor to Mrs Gandhi at that time, makes clear in his 
memoirs that she saw this as a political decision, in part for electoral concerns to be 
seen as „an angel of the poor‟ and in part, to manoeuvre herself into a stronger 
position against certain elements in the Congress Party such as Morarji Desai, who 
was Deputy Prime Minister at that time (Patel 2002). The growth benefits of bank 
nationalisation was an unintended positive outcome,  as the proponents of bank 
nationalisation were more concerned about the possible positive effects that 
nationalisation may have on poverty reduction, especially in rural areas. The 
motive for the increase in public investment from the mid-1970s is less clear, but it 
had do in some measure with a redress of the underinvestment in the public sector 
that had occurred from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. The changes in trade 
policy can be attributed at least in part to a change in the attitude of the economic 
bureaucracy towards import controls. Therefore, among the key growth-enhancing 
policies, it was the set of policies pertaining to international trade that can be 
unambiguously linked to “the abandonment of left-leaning anti-capitalist rhetoric 
and policies, and prioritising of economic growth” (Kohli 2006: 1252). 
 
While informal institutional change related to the attitudinal change of the 
state and bureaucracy to the private sector certainly aided the growth of private 
investment that was observed from the late 1970s by sending positive signals to 
entrepreneurs, the attitudinal shift of the state cannot in itself explain the surge in 
private investment and consequently, the acceleration in economic growth. Thus, 
while informal institutional change was complementary to formal institutional 
change in bringing about India‟s growth acceleration, it was not a substitute for 
formal institutional change in their effects on economic growth (Helme and 
Levistky 2004).   Formal institutional changes was the key to India‟s growth 
acceleration, even though these changes did not seem particularly growth 
enhancing (as in the case of bank nationalisation) or that radical (as in the case of 
trade reforms) at that time, and in the context of the major economic reforms of 
1991. 
 
 
THE PATTERN OF GROWTH 
 
We now turn to an examination of the pattern of growth and its implications for 
broader economic development. Among the three main sectors of economic 
activity, manufacturing and services have been responsible for the increase in 
economic growth in the 1980s, and services in particular in the 1990s, as we can 
see in Figure 13. Growth rates in agriculture, on the other hand, have remained at 
an average of 2 to 3 per cent per annum over the five decades since independence.  
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One of the major concerns economists have had about the post-reform growth 
in India is the low rate of job creation that has been observed in spite of the high 
growth rates. Deepak Nayyar points out that the overall employment elasticities of 
output – a measure of the job creating potential of economic growth – has fallen 
from 0.54 in the late seventies to 0.16 in 1993/94 to 1999/2000.  A great part of the 
fall in the employment elasticity of output can be attributed to a strong growth in 
labour productivity since the early 1980s, but it can also be due to a pattern of 
growth that has not particularly been employment-intensive. 
 
Notwithstanding the weak job creation in the economy in the 1980s and 
1990s, poverty rates seem to have fallen steadily since the 1970s, after showing no 
clear trend in the first two decades since independence. This has occurred both in 
rural and urban areas, as Figure 14 makes clear. However, the rate of decline in 
poverty is not as much as we may expect from the high rates of economic growth 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Deaton and Dreze 2008).  
 
 
Figure 14. Poverty Rates, Rural and Urban 
 
Note: 1951 is August 1951 to November 1952, 1960 is July 1960 to August 1961, 1987, 
1970 is July 1970 to June 1971 is July 1987 to June1988, 1993 is July 1993 to June 1994, 
and 1999 is July 1999 to June 2000. 
Source: Panagariya (2008) for all years, except  estimates for 1999 which are from Deaton 
and Dreze (2002). 
 
 
The Transformation that Never Was 
 
Why has there been a low rate of job creation in the high growth era of the 
Indian economy? To answer this question, it is important to recognise that India‟s 
pattern of growth has been atypical and has not followed the standard path that we 
have seen other economies, especially with large supplies of mostly unskilled 
labour, follow. All the major Asian economies, starting with Japan, then Korea, 
Singapore, and Taiwan, and now more recently, China and Vietnam, have moved 
from the import substituting phases of their economic development to an export-
oriented development strategy that witnessed in its initial years, a strong growth in 
the labour intensive segment of the manufacturing sector. In all these countries, as 
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their economies integrated more closely with world markets, economic growth and 
structural transformation from an agriculture based to a manufacturing based 
economy went hand in hand, one driving the other. Surplus labour was pulled, 
sometimes in massive amounts, from less productive agriculture to the more 
productive manufacturing sector, and economic growth was driven in its early 
stages by a rapid expansion of labour-intensive manufacturing, mostly producing 
for export markets (Riedel 1988, Haggard 1996, Krueger 1997). This was not the 
case in India, where the labour –intensive manufacturing sector did not become the 
engine of growth. In fact, it was the knowledge-intensive services sector which 
along with some segments of capital intensive manufacturing was the engines of 
growth in India. These sectors by their nature were not employment-intensive. 
Whatever jobs that were created outside of agriculture were mostly in the low 
productivity – low wage informal services sector (comprising mostly trade, hotels 
and restaurants). The informal services sector, as is well recognised, depends on 
the growth of other sectors, and therefore, cannot be the leading sector of growth. 
By virtue of its „follower‟ status in sectoral growth, it is constrained in its capacity 
to absorb any more of the labour force in agriculture than it has in recent years.      
 
The atypical nature of structural transformation in India is clear from Figures 
16 and 17, which show the stagnation in manufacturing output and employment 
over time, and the increase in both the formal and informal segments of the 
services sector in total output, and the growth of the informal services sector in 
total employment. Further examination of employment and output patterns in the 
formal manufacturing sector shows that not only has manufacturing stagnated as a 
share of total output and total employment, but the labour-intensive segment of the 
formal manufacturing sector has contracted steadily over time (Sen 2008). Such a 
development pattern has neither been efficient nor equitable, as it has not been 
built on the foundation of the innate comparative advantage India possesses in 
unskilled labour intensive manufacturing (as has argued by Wood and Calandrino 
2000 for example), and has limited the poverty reducing impact of economic 
growth. 
 
 
Figure 15. Composition of GDP 
 
Notes: Formal and informal manufacturing are registered and unregistered manufacturing in the 
Indian national income accounts. We define formal services as the finance and communication 
sectors, and informal services as the trade, hotel and restaurant sector. Others include mining, 
construction and the public sector. 
Source: our calculations, from National Accounts Statistics. 
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Figure 16 . Employment by Sector 
 
Source: Ramaswamy (2007) 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS 
 
Most growth accelerations in developing countries tend to die out over time or are 
reversed – the defining feature of growth accelerations is their ephemeral nature 
and their inability to „last the distance‟ (Hausman, Pritchett and Rodrik 2005). 
There are few instances of sustained growth over several decades in the developing 
world – India has now joined a select club of „growth miracles‟ which include 
countries as disparate in size, geographical location and initial conditions as Chile 
in Latin America, Botswana and Mauritius in Africa, and China, Vietnam and 
ofcourse the Tigers and Cubs of East Asia. However, India‟s ascendancy as an 
economic power along with China‟s has more significant implications for 
economic well-being than these other countries, given the size of its economy and 
the number of the poor that inhabited these two countries at the beginning of the 
growth process. There is little doubt that “the emergence of China and India in the 
global economy has been one of the most significant economic developments of 
the past quarter century” (Bosworth and Collins 2008).   
 
Most interpretations of India‟s growth acceleration have tended to privilege 
one dimension of the growth experience over another, and the two dominant 
perspectives take India‟s economic growth either as a product of neoliberal 
economics of current times or as a late reward to the statist policies of the past.  
However, the story of India‟s growth told thus far points to a more complex causal 
story than has been commonly portrayed both in the popular press and in scholarly 
writings on India, and  we have argued that no single perspective can provide a 
convincing explanation of India‟s growth phenomenon.  
 
We have also argued that in contrast to the previous growth success stories of 
the developing world, especially those originating from Asia, India‟s pattern of 
growth has followed a non-standard and what I could call a perverse route, and that 
such a growth pattern that privileges knowledge-intensive services and capital-
intensive manufacturing over labour-intensive manufacturing is not in India‟s long-
term interests, either from viewpoints of efficiency or equity. Clearly, whether 
India can maintain its strong economic growth in the future, and at the same time, 
have a more equitable development strategy in the twenty-first century than it has 
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in the last century is intimately related to its ability to reclaim its lost 
transformation from an agriculture-based to a manufacturing-based economy. 
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